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reGional DiSputeS: it iS not JuSt GrounD beeF
Nicholas Laneville*
AbstrAct
Members of the World Trade Organization are violat-ing Article 6 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures by failing 
to adapt their sanitary and phytosanitary measures to regional 
conditions. Instead, they continue to impose broad, trade-restric-
tive measures that are based on national borders instead of on a 
regional basis. The sanitary and phytosanitary (pest and disease) 
status of a nation is unlikely to be uniform throughout a coun-
try, and, consequently, under Article 6 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Members 
are required to adapt their restrictions on imports to conditions 
that prevail on a regional basis as opposed to on a national one. 
Failure to adhere to the obligations under Article 6 has a dispa-
rately large impact on developing and least developed countries 
because those countries are inherently more susceptible and less 
well equipped to deal with infections of disease and infestations 
of pests. The result is that a greater number developing and least 
developed countries are systematically precluded from effec-
tively engaging in the international trade of their animal and plan 
products for no scientifically supported reason.
Article 6 of this Agreement has been the subject of multi-
lateral discussion and confusion since its inception. It has only 
been formally interpreted at the Dispute Settlement Body three 
times (once in June 2015, once in July 2015, and once in August 
2016). This confusion has led to a poor understanding of associ-
ated obligations and to Members’ imposition of trade-restrictive 
measures which violate Article 6. It appears that some Members 
are taking advantage of the poor understanding of obligations 
under Article 6 to raise unnecessary and over-restrictive barri-
ers to trade. These barriers include those protecting domestic 
industries at the expense of frustrated exporters, and barriers 
ill-tailored to regions affected by disease.
This Comment seeks to clarify the obligations under Article 
6 and to illuminate current violations. It applies the legal analy-
sis from the July 2015 WTO decision, United States – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Animals, Meat and other Animal 
Products from Argentina, to current measures. Through that 
analysis, this Comment unveils some of the egregious violations 
of Article 6 that barricade sustainable development in develop-
ing and least developing countries today.
I. IntroductIon
On July 24, 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) circulated a panel report 
interpreting Article 6, “Adaptation to Regional Conditions,” of 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures1 (“SPS Agreement”).2 Article 6 of the SPS Agreement 
mandates that Members adapt their measures governing the 
importation of consumable goods, plants, and animals to the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (“SPS”) conditions of the regions 
from which they are importing, rather than applying those mea-
sures broadly to entire countries.3 As diseases and infections do 
not abide by State lines, a regional approach is a safe and less 
trade-restrictive approach than a nation-based one, and there-
fore better conforms to the WTO’s goal of trade liberalization. 
Further, from a development standpoint, the effective imple-
mentation of Article 6 is paramount for less developed nations 
because they are more susceptible to SPS-related harms, and, 
therefore, more likely to needlessly suffer from the imposition 
of trade restrictions that are not adopted on a regional basis.4 The 
effect of failures to properly implement Article 6 into Members’ 
SPS regimes slows the growth of less developed economies 
by unnecessarily precluding trade in the name of non-existent 
health risks.5
A theoretical example of how this obligation applies is illus-
trative: imagine New Zealand wishes to export its lamb products 
to Germany. New Zealand is a nation comprised of two islands: 
the North Island and the South island. Lamb from the Southern 
Island is fraught with Foot-and-Mouth disease, but there is no 
scientific evidence that the lamb from the Northern Island suf-
fers from the disease. In accordance with Article 6 of the SPS 
Agreement, Germany must tailor its border measures applicable 
to the importation of lamb from New Zealand to the regional 
conditions that exist in New Zealand, and, therefore, it may block 
imports of lamb from the South Island of New Zealand, but not 
from the North.
Yet, there has been some confusion as to the implications 
of Article 6. Namely, Members are unsure to what extent they 
must tailor their measures to accommodate for small regions in 
exporting countries when the majority of that country has been 
affected by pest or disease. Members (and the DSB)6 also strug-
gle to define some practical applications of Article 6; how much 
time does a Member have to adapt its measures when conditions 
in previously infected exporting regions improve?
United States – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Animals, Meat and other Animal Products from Argentina 
(“United States – Animals”) was the second occasion upon which 
a panel had the opportunity to formally interpret Article 6.7 The 
recent decision helped to clarify some of the above-mentioned 
confusions through the Panel’s incorporation of the obligations 
held within Articles 5.78 and 89 of the SPS Agreement to the 
* American University Washington College of Law, J.D. candidate 2017. Thank 
you to Gina Colarusso for her diligent edits and unwavering support. Thank you, 
also, to Professors Padideh Ala’i, Sean Flynn, and Fernanda Nicola for your 
dedication to your students. 
37Fall 2016
practical application of Article 6. The Panel recognized that 
the procedure for obtaining recognition of a region as pest or 
disease-free necessitates a risk assessment,10 which is governed 
by Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, and an approval procedure,11 
which is governed by Article 8 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel 
acknowledged that a Member imposing a barrier to trade based 
on SPS factors has an obligation to undertake a risk assessment 
“within a reasonable period of time” in accordance with Article 
5,12 and to proceed with approval procedures “without undue 
delay” in accordance with Article 813 when dealing with requests 
for recognition of regional pest and disease conditions.14
By incorporating time constraints on the adaptation of 
relevant measures, this interpretation gives Article 6 teeth. It 
imposes an obligation not only to recognize regional conditions, 
but also to adapt measures in accordance with those conditions in 
a timely manner, thus effectively addressing the recurring issue 
where a Member has created a disease-free area within national 
boarders, “only to face significant delays obtaining recognition 
by their trading partners.”15
Under the analysis that the Panel applied in United States–
Animals, it is clear that some Members continue to violate 
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement by applying over-broad SPS 
measures and failing to adapt them to prevailing SPS conditions 
on a regional basis. This Comment highlights this phenomenon 
through a selection of case studies.16 Part II of this Comment 
discusses the principles behind SPS measures and pertinent facts 
of current scenarios where measures have not been tailored to 
regional conditions.17 Part III analyzes those facts under the 
legal framework propounded in United States – Animals.18 Part 
IV recommends that the analysis that was applied in United 
States–Animals be adopted by the WTO Membership as a useful 
and positive step in the effective implementation of Article 6.19 
However, Part V concludes that while United States – Animals is 
useful, it does leave some important questions unanswered: what 
constitutes a “reasonable time” and “undue delay” in this con-
text? These questions must be answered in order for Members 
to fully understand and implement this important Article and in 
order to mitigate the unnecessary harms and impediments that 
are falling particularly hard on developing economies.20
II. bAckground
The SPS Agreement is one of the covered agreements under 
the WTO.21 The Agreement governs the implementation of SPS 
measures, which are designed to protect human, animal, and 
plant life.22 The SPS Agreement emphasizes the importance of 
sound scientific evidence as the basis of implementation of such 
measures.23
Today, as taxes, tariffs, and duties are continually lowered, 
Members employ alternative, more technical means to protect 
their domestic suppliers and restrict access to their markets.24 
One of the SPS Agreement’s mandates is to attempts to reduce 
the application of non-essential, over trade-restrictive measures 
that block goods from entering countries when there is no 
scientifically based reason for such restrictions.25 Despite this 
mandate, at the 2015 “Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures” hearing, the WTO Membership voiced a record 
number of concerns relating to inappropriate and over-restrictive 
uses of SPS measures.26 The nature of the measures in question 
brings to light concerns for sustainable development because 
of these measures’ disparate impact on developing economies. 
This Section first explains what Members’ obligations are under 
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement, and then relates the relevant 
facts of some regimes that are violating that Article.
a. the SpS aGreement’S FounDation anD how  
it pertainS to article 6, “aDaptation to  
reGional conDitionS”
The SPS Agreement is not a set of standards to which all 
Members must adhere, but rather a set of rules that governs the 
implementation of SPS measures.27 It provides a set of prin-
ciples under which SPS Measures must be adopted by Member 
States, affording them latitude in the specific Measures that they 
elect to adopt. One principle that is enshrined in the Agreement, 
for example, is the broad requirement that measures be based 
in science. This strikes the balance between allowing Members 
to enforce the health standards that they deem necessary and 
requiring that those standards be scientifically provably neces-
sary.28 Article 6 is a perfect reflection of that same balance. 
Thereunder, Members may adapt measures that limit or preclude 
imports from areas that have been affected by SPS-related dis-
eases or infestations, as long as those measures are scientifically 
justified, and appropriately tailored to the affected area(s).29
1. obliGatioNS uNder article 6, “adaptatioN to 
reGioNal coNditioNS”
Members have had difficulty understanding their obliga-
tions under Article 6 since the inception of the SPS Agreement. 
In 1999, the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
adopted the first Review of the Operation and Implementation of 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, which concluded that Article 6 required further devel-
opment.30 Further, Article 6 was an item on the agenda for that 
Committee in every meeting from 2003 through 2007,31 and 
has continued to be an issue through 2016.32 Limiting restric-
tions on trade to areas affected by disease or pests is a popular 
concept throughout the Membership of the WTO. However, the 
Membership seems to have difficulty agreeing on the implemen-
tation of this restriction. Some Members lobby for hard line rules 
on the length of the process for recognition of disease or pest-free 
areas, while others advocate for a more flexible approach.33 As a 
result, Members continue to express frustrations with acquiring 
pest or disease-free status under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.
Members’ frustrations stem from systems that are in 
place which may be deemed to violate Article 6 of the SPS 
Agreement.34 Importing Members’ slow processing, or failure 
to process, requests for recognition of disease or pest-free areas 
causes regimes where importers do not recognize such areas in 
a timely manner, or worse, they do not recognize such areas at 
all.35 This leads to vexation amongst exporters, and potential for 
claims at the DSB under Article 6.
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a. The United States–Animals Panel’s framework for 
analysis under Article 6
The Panel in United States – Animals clarified how to 
approach an analysis under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. 
The Panel first assessed, through textual analysis, the individual 
obligations under each of the three paragraphs of Article 6 (6.1, 
6.2, and 6.3), and then analyzed the application of the Article as 
a whole.36
Accordingly, the Panel began with an examination of the 
text of Article 6.1.37 It determined that “adapt[ing]” a measure 
means the measure is calibrated to the prevailing food, animal, 
and plant health conditions in areas affected by the measure; the 
measure does not unnecessarily restrict goods from areas that do 
not pose health risks.”38 The Panel also briefly considered the 
definition of an “area,” and adopted the definition in the text of 
the provision: “all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts 
of several countries.”39 The Panel concluded that the second 
sentence of Article 6.1 “presupposes that Members undertake an 
assessment of the SPS characteristics of a region.”40 It iterated 
that the list contained in the second sentence of Article 6.1, enu-
merating factors to be considered when a Member is conducting 
such an assessment, is not exhaustive because of the inclusion of 
the term “inter alia” 41 in that sentence.42 Thus, once a Member 
has assessed the relevant factors to determine the SPS conditions 
of a region, then it must adapt its SPS measures in accordance 
with its findings.43
The Panel also addressed the meaning of paragraph 2 
of Article 6.44 It determined that the terms “recognize” and 
“concepts” indicate that Members must accept the validity of 
‘pest- or disease-free areas’, and that they must consider them 
in applying SPS measures.45 Additionally, the Guidelines to 
Further the Practical Implementation of Article 6, adopted by 
the SPS Committee in 2008, emphasized that the procedure for 
gaining recognition of a pest or disease-free area should be pub-
licized and accessible.46 The Panel’s determination with regard 
to Article 6.2 effectively forces Members to consider SPS condi-
tions on a regional basis form a conceptual standpoint, and to 
publicize their individual interpretations of that concept.
Article 6.347 is directed only at exporting Members. The 
Panel determined that an exporting Member must establish that 
the area that it seeks to have recognized as pest or disease-free 
is indeed pest or disease-free and is likely to remain an area of 
such characteristics. So, an exporting Member that is subject to 
an SPS-based trade barrier imposed by an importing Member 
carries the burden of adequately demonstrating that its area is 
and is likely to remain a pest and disease-free area in order to 
overcome the importing Member’s barrier.48
Perhaps the most important determination in the Panel’s 
analysis was that Members’ obligations under Articles 5.749 
and 850 of the SPS Agreement also applied to the obligations 
under Article 651: The process of recognizing a region as a pest 
or disease-free area under Article 6 must be carried out without 
“undue delay,” and within “a reasonable period of time.”52
b. The United States–Animals Panel’s framework applied
In United States – Animals, the allegedly offending measure 
was an American ban on Argentinian beef. Various regions of 
Argentina had suffered from infestations of foot and mouth dis-
ease for a number of years, and, accordingly, the United States 
maintained a ban on Argentinian Beef since 2001. Argentina did 
request recognition of Northern Argentina and the Patagonia 
region as FMD-free, but the relevant authority, the Animal 
and Plant Health Inspections Service (“APHIS”), did not grant 
recognition.53
The Panel in United States–Animals considered Argentina’s 
claim that the United States was in violation of its obligations 
under Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement because the United 
States had failed to adapt its measures to the SPS characteristics 
of the Patagonia region of Argentina, and instead banned beef 
products from all of Argentina.54 Argentina’s successful claim 
was that under the United States’ framework for recognition of 
pest and disease-free regions55, the United States failed to recog-
nize Patagonia as a disease-free area despite Argentina’s requests 
for recognition Argentina having adequately demonstrated that 
Patagonia was, and was likely to remain, disease-free.56
The United States–Animals Panel noted at the outset of its 
analysis that the Animals and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(“APHIS”)57 had not yet recognized Patagonia as a region 
within Argentina, but, instead, viewed Argentina as one single 
region.58 The Panel then endeavored to answer whether the 
United States’ failure to recognize Patagonia as a region within 
Argentina deserving different treatment amounted to a violation 
of the United States’ obligations under Article 6.1 of the SPS 
Agreement to adapt its measures to regional conditions.59
The Panel assessed whether Argentina had objectively 
failed to demonstrate that Patagonia was FMD-free and likely to 
remain so.60 The United States’ primary argument for not adapt-
ing its measure to Patagonian conditions was that APHIS had 
not yet completed its evaluation of the area, so it was unable to 
afford Patagonia disease-free status.61 This argument fell flat, as 
APHIS itself had declared that it was satisfied that it had suf-
ficient information to proceed with finalization of its review, 
yet it did not complete that review.62 Further, the Panel con-
ducted its own review of Patagonia’s conditions and concluded 
that Patagonia was indeed FMD-free. The Panel decided that 
Argentina had objectively demonstrated that Patagonia was and 
was likely to remain FMD-free in accordance with Article 6.1.63
The Panel then assessed if Argentina had granted reason-
able access to APHIS for it to conduct an inspection, testing, and 
other relevant procedures.64 The Panel highlighted that Argentina 
had agreed to two site visits from APHIS: one in 2003 and one in 
2009.65 In light of its earlier findings under Articles 5.7 and 8,66 
the Panel determined that the United States had failed to com-
plete its review of the prevailing SPS conditions in Patagonia 
without undue delay and to adapt its measure appropriately 
within a reasonable period of time.67 This, in combination with 
the United States’ failure to adapt its measures accordingly, con-
stituted a violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.68
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b. reGimeS currently in violation: inDoneSia  
anD ruSSia
The United States–Animals case will serve as a backdrop to 
analyze Chile’s concerns with respect to Indonesia’s restrictions 
on importation of fruits and the EU’s concerns with respect to 
Russia’s restrictions on importation of pigs and pork products, 
both of which will be discussed further below. These two cases 
are good examples for discussion in the context of violations of 
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement for three main reasons: First, the 
restrictive measures raised by Indonesia and Russia are neces-
sarily based on SPS conditions, which enables a discussion of 
Article 6’s application to those measures. Second, the restric-
tions applied by Indonesia and Russia take different forms which 
permits an exploration of different types of SPS measures and 
Article 6’s application thereto. Finally, both of these examples 
are of ongoing trade restrictions that impact international trade 
across countries that are in different stages of development, 
and demonstrate the existing abuse and/or misunderstanding of 
Article 6 by WTO Members through their failure to adapt mea-
sures to regional conditions.
1. iNdoNeSia-Fruit
In 2012, Indonesia notified the SPS committee of its inten-
tion to prohibit imports of fruits and vegetables into Tanjung 
Priok, one of the main ports for imports in the nation’s capital, 
Jakarta.69 Indonesia claimed that this prohibition was to preserve 
plant health and human health due to plant pests or disease and to 
protect its territory from other damage from pests.70 Indonesia’s 
trading partners, including Chile, were concerned about the con-
sequences of this prohibition.71
Chile notified the SPS committee of its concerns regard-
ing the Indonesian measure in July, 2014.72 By that time, the 
Indonesian measure had been in place for three years and was 
affecting trade considerably.73 Considering Chile was the fourth 
largest importer of fruits to Indonesia in 2013,74 and that fruit 
constitutes 7% of Chilean exports75, it has a significant inter-
est in Indonesia quickly recognizing it as fruit fly-free. Chile 
provided Indonesia with the necessary documents establishing 
it as a fruit-fly free region and invited Indonesia to perform a 
“technical visit” to Chile to conduct relevant risk-assessment 
procedures and to complete Indonesian’s recognition process.76 
The Indonesian authorities never visited Chile.77
Indonesia expressed that its measure had been ratified to 
protect consumers from the spread of new pests and diseases.78 
It specified that it was free from Medfly79 (a variety of fruit 
fly) and precautionary measures had been taken with respect to 
nations that it deemed contaminated with Medfly. Indonesia has 
argued that its maintenance of the ban on fruit products from 
Chile is justified because the Indonesian Quarantine Agency 
(“IQA”) determined that in 2013 Medfly was found in the 
Valparaíso region of Chile, so a prohibition is warranted.80
Consequently, Chilean fruit has not been allowed through 
the Jakarta port.81 While Indonesian law in 2013 allowed for 
the retention of a Member’s pest-free status when outbreaks 
were quickly detected and controlled, Chile was not afforded an 
opportunity to demonstrate that it had adequately dealt with its 
alleged infestation.82 Chile again invited Indonesia to conduct a 
technical visit in 2014 to ascertain if Chile’s expeditious eradica-
tion of the outbreak was complete, and, again, Indonesia did not 
come.83 Chile also noted that other nations’ requests for recogni-
tion as fruit fly-free have been granted.84 Chile did suffer a new 
(regional) outbreak of Medfly in July 2015.85
2. ruSSia-piGS aNd pork productS86
In March, 2014, the European Union (“EU”) expressed its 
concerns about Russian measures raised in response to studies 
that found prevalence of African Swine Fever (“ASF”) in four 
wild boars in two of the EU’s Member states: Lithuania and 
Poland.87 Russia noted that ever since the outbreak within its ter-
ritory in 2008, ASF had caused significant harm to the Russian 
economy, so it deemed the measures to be a proportionate and 
necessary response.88 Russia expressed specific concerns that 
the EU’s policy on ASF was not unified enough, and that it did 
not ensure adequate protection from affected Members within 
the Union.89 It feared that ASF infected animals and animal 
products could pass between Members too freely.90 As a result, 
Russia has banned the importation of pork products from 
Lithuania91, Poland92, and the rest of the EU.93
The EU emphasized that it took immediate action to com-
partmentalize the affected areas and enacted stringent measures 
to control the spread of ASF.94 The EU argued that in both the 
outbreak in Lithuania and Poland, it kept Russia informed of the 
situation and of the steps that were being taken.95 In fact, in the 
case of the Lithuania outbreak, Russia, along with the Office of 
Epizootics (“OIE”–also known as the World Organization for 
Animal Health), partook in the expert mission to analyze the 
SPS conditions in the region of the outbreak.96
The EU’s primary concern is that Russia’s approach to 
bans on Polish and Lithuanian pork products was not done on 
a regional basis but on a national one.97 Further, the EU argues 
that the ban effectively is not contained to those two nations, but 
rather is imposed on the EU as a whole.98
The European Union additionally expressed frustration at 
the different treatment that it received compared to Ukraine.99 
Ukraine suffered an outbreak of ASF in its Luhansk region, 
which caused Russia to implement measures restricting trade in 
pork products from that region but not from the whole country.100
III. AnAlysIs
Under the analysis propounded in United States – Animals, 
some Members are violating Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.101 
As it has been difficult for the Membership to agree on the prac-
tical implementation and significance of this Article, the con-
sequence of the analysis promulgated in United States–Animals 
could be that some aspects of Article 6 have been effectively 
decided for the Membership, as WTO decisions have indeed 
affected international practices in the past.102 This has two 
implications: first, the Panel decision makes the trade-efficient, 
regional approach in Article 6 more concrete as precedent 
accumulates.103 Second, this decision encourages Members to 
reform their SPS measures through a regional approach in order 
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to avoid claims against them that are supported by the analysis 
from United States–Animals.
The analysis from United States – Animals provides a clear 
and complete assessment of Members’ obligations under Article 
6.104 In this section, that analysis is applied to reveal the viola-
tions that prevail in Indonesia and Russia. The objective of this 
analysis is to substantiate that in some countries, SPS measures 
are implemented in violation of Article 6, either due to a mis-
understanding of the obligations under that Article or due to the 
unscrupulous intent of the implementing government wishing to 
protect domestic markets. The two examples explored here are 
the Indonesian ban on importation of fruits from Chile105 and the 
Russian ban on importation of pigs and pork products from the 
European Union.106 For clarity, a brief overview of the United 
States – Animals’ Article 6 analysis is provided below preceding 
the application of that analysis to the abovementioned examples.
1. a conciSe overview oF the uniteD StateS – 
animalS analySiS
The Analysis under United States – Animals proceeds as 
follows: the first prong is an assessment of the trade-restricting 
measure on its face.107 The goal of this assessment is to deter-
mine if the measure allows for the recognition of areas affected 
by infestation or disease as separate from those that are not and 
to determine if the measures permit different treatment of those 
areas. It is a simple assessment of whether the measure recog-
nizes unaffected areas and does not subject them to the same 
measures as the affected areas.108 If the measure fails to do this, 
then we proceed to the second prong of the analysis.
The second prong seeks to assess if that failure to recognize 
pest and disease-free areas as separate from affected areas rises 
to the level of a violation of Article 6.1 by not accommodating 
for varied SPS conditions where accommodation is warranted.109 
This is done through an assessment of the Member seeking recog-
nition’s SPS characteristics110 to evaluate if a regional approach 
would be warranted. It is at this stage that the obligation under 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement to seek relevant information 
in a timely manner begins to take effect.111 If the Member that 
imposed the measure did not have good reason to treat the areas 
that its measure affects in a uniform manner, and it did not seek 
out or willingly accept information that would help to tailor the 
measure to the relevant areas, then there may be a violation of 
Article 6.1. However, the third prong of the analysis may still 
exonerate or condemn the measure-imposing Member.
The third and final prong is an assessment of whether the 
Member seeking recognition has made a convincing showing 
that the relevant region is, and is likely to remain pest or disease-
free. If throughout the process of requesting recognition, the 
requesting Member fails to provide adequate evidence to objec-
tively demonstrate that it is pest or disease-free, the failures of 
the enacting Member to adapt its measure to regional conditions 
may be forgiven.112
However, where the Member seeking recognition has pro-
vided evidence that adequately demonstrates its pest and dis-
ease-free status and it has requested recognition such status, the 
measure-imposing Member is in a precarious situation. It is here 
that the obligations under Articles 5.7 and 8 truly come into full 
effect. Under Article 5.7, the enacting Member must have sought 
relevant information “in a timely manner”113 so as to enable its 
regional adaptation of its measure as appropriate. Under Article 
8, the enacting Member must have proceeded with the Member 
requesting recognition’s request for recognition “without undue 
delay.”114 Failure to comply with those time requirements consti-
tutes a violation of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.
a. uNited StateS – aNiMalS’ article 6 FraMework 
applied to iNdoNeSia’S baN oF cHileaN Fruit
When applying the framework that the United States – 
Animals Panel used, it is important to recall that the claim in 
that case was not that the United States’ law did not allow for 
recognition of pest and disease-free areas, but that “as applied,” 
the United States had failed to follow Article 6-compliant pro-
cedures to recognize such regions.115 In addition, the Panel’s 
application of the time constraints in Articles 5.7116 and 8117 
to the review process of such applications for recognition118 is 
incorporated into the analysis below.
The first question to be answered is whether Indonesia 
recognized the area(s) that were affected by a pest infestation 
and the areas that were not, as separate.119 Indonesia’s measure 
was applied to all of its trade partners, regardless of their pest-
status, and the measure applied to all territories therein.120 The 
port that Indonesia chose to close to fruit imports is one of its 
two main ports for imports, and, specifically, it is a notable port 
for importation of fruit products.121 Indonesia has the sovereign 
right to close ports or impose bans, but it justified its ban based 
on SPS characteristics, and therefore its measures must comply 
with the SPS Agreement.122 Contrary to Indonesia’s obligations 
under Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement, it imposed this ban 
without recognizing regions within its trading partners’ terri-
tories as disease or pest-free areas. Further, this is contrary to 
Indonesia’s obligation under the SPS Agreement to seek the least 
trade restrictive means to achieve its protective goals.123
The next prong of the analysis is to establish if this failure 
to recognize Chile, or areas of Chile, as pest-free, can rise to the 
level of a violation of Article 6.1.124 An assessment of Chile’s 
fruit fly status and the prevalence of this unwanted pest125 is 
needed to determine if Indonesia’s measures are adapted to those 
characteristics. Indonesia argued that its measure was maintained 
with respect to Chile, because a relevant agency had informa-
tion that the Valparaíso region of Chile had suffered an infesta-
tion of Medfly in 2013.126 The Valparaíso region accounts for 
roughly two percent of Chile’s surface area, and the ban effects 
all fruit products from Chile.127 Chile expeditiously eradicated 
the infestation of Medfly128 and invited Indonesia to conduct a 
technical visit to judge the efficaciousness of Chile’s eradication 
program.129 No such visit ever occurred.130
In this light, Indonesia’s ban was not tailored to the SPS 
conditions (fruit fly status) prevailing in Chile because it blocked 
all fruit products from entry to its port, when its information 
indicated that only two percent of Chile had a fruit fly problem. 
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However, this may be forgiven if Chile did not provide adequate 
access to materials that would prove that areas of Chile were free 
of pests.131 This requirement is unlikely to absolve Indonesia 
because in addition to inviting Indonesia to perform its technical 
visit, Chile has provided Indonesia with all relevant documenta-
tion for it to be declared a fruit fly-free nation and has requested 
formal recognition as such on several occasions.132
Another important part of the Panel’s consideration in 
United States – Animals was the time that the United States took 
to review Argentina’s request for recognition.133 In Chile’s case, 
the Indonesian import ban has been in place for three years and 
seven months. Chile had been a fruit-fly free nation for two years 
until the outbreak in July 2015.134 The new outbreak makes it 
difficult to determine if a panel would consider this to consti-
tute an “undue delay”135 of conducting a recognition process136 
because the delay may be considered a precautionary measure, 
and, given the outbreak, not “undue”. However, an outbreak still 
does not necessitate an outright ban on fruit products; the United 
States, for example, has elected to ban fruit products that harbor 
medfly from affected regions in response to Chile’s outbreak as 
opposed to all of Chile’s fruit products.137
Chile likely satisfied the third prong of the United States – 
Animals analysis and met the burden of proof of showing that it 
had fruit fly-free regions. The current infestation in Chile does 
raise the question as to whether it carried its burden of proving 
that areas in Chile are likely to remain fruit fly-free, but even 
the current infestation is not prevalent throughout the entirety of 
Chile.138 Thus, Indonesia’s failure to recognize the areas outside 
of the Valparaíso region (and now the Tarapaca and Coquimbo 
regions) and adapt its measure accordingly, likely constitutes a 
violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.
Commentators have argued that the Indonesian economy 
could benefit from a reduction of supply of foreign fruit and 
vegetables, and thereby an increase in consumption of local 
produce, and that this may have been a factor in limiting imports 
through the measure at issue.139 Arguably, the Chilean govern-
ment used delay tactics to draw out the time it would take to 
get a region recognized and to maximize consumption of local 
fruits.140 Obligations under Article 6 must be understood and 
adhered to reduce such abuses. Indonesia’s ban on fruit exports 
from all of Chile is a prime example of an over-trade restrictive 
measure that must be seen as a violation of Article 6 of the SPS 
Agreement.
b. uNited StateS – aNiMalS’ article 6 FraMework 
applied to ruSSia’S baN oF piGS aNd pork productS 
FroM tHe europeaN uNioN
The European Union’s claim, similar to the case above, is 
that as applied, Russia’s ban on pigs and pork products from 
Poland, Lithuania, and the rest of the EU fails to recognize dis-
ease-free areas.141 The EU’s claim is that Russia not only failed 
to recognize affected and unaffected areas as separate, but that 
the measure is applied in a vastly over-broad manner.142
Russia’s measure is in violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS 
Agreement because it treats areas affected by African Swine 
Flu and unaffected areas uniformly. The territories affected by 
disease are parts of Poland and Lithuania, yet the measure as 
applied does not recognize disease-free areas within the EU. The 
scenarios in Lithuania and in Poland are very similar, and their 
treatment from Russia both had impacts on the EU as a whole, so 
they will be referenced interchangeably throughout this analysis.
Again, the first step of the analysis is to determine if Russia’s 
ban recognizes areas that were affected by the outbreak and those 
that were not as separate and affords those two groups different 
treatment. Russia’s measure amounts to an EU-wide ban on pork 
products. It does not recognize affected and unaffected areas as 
separate, and does not afford them different treatment.143
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether 
Russia’s failure to recognize the unaffected regions within 
Lithuania, Poland, and, more broadly the EU as disease-free rises 
to a violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.144 This is 
accomplished through an assessment of the prevailing SPS char-
acteristics of the relevant regions and determining if Russia’s 
measures were adapted therefore.145 The relevant criteria listed 
within Article 6.1 are the level of prevalence of the disease and 
the measures that Lithuania, Poland, and the EU took to control 
and eradicate the outbreak of ASF.146
The level of prevalence is demonstrative of the over-broad 
nature of Russia’s measures.147 A mere four ASF-infected wild 
boars that were detected in Lithuania and Poland were the 
foundation for Russia’s EU-wide ban.148 Additionally, the EU 
contended that scientific evidence showed that the disease found 
in the boars within the EU territories matched the disease that 
was found in boars in Russia, which would suggest that the risk 
of “spread” of the disease is greatly reduced because it would 
already be in Russia.149 Banning imports of pork and pork prod-
ucts from all of the EU due to the discovery of four ASF-infected 
wild boars must be seen as overly broad, and not adapted to 
regional conditions.
Analysis of the measures taken by Lithuania, Poland, and 
the EU to disrupt the spread of ASF reveals the unbalanced 
nature of Russia’s approach. The EU, along with Lithuania and 
Poland, emphasized that they took immediate action to compart-
mentalize150 the affected areas and enact stringent measures to 
control the spread of ASF.151 This approach is compliant with 
the World Organization for Animal Health (the body that sets 
international standards for animal health)152 and aims to isolate 
the disease. Russia’s measure that bans the importation of pork 
and pork products from the entire EU is not tailored to the condi-
tions prevailing in Lithuania and Poland, or the EU.
Again, under the third prong of the analysis, if Russia had 
implemented this broad measure as a safety precaution, and 
then the EU failed to demonstrate that any portion of the EU 
was going to remain ASF-free, then Russia’s failure to adapt 
to regional conditions may have been excused.153 Russia’s 
expressed reasons for applying its ban to all of the EU was for 
fear that the internal measures in the EU were not stringent 
enough to prevent the spread of ASF contamination.154 However, 
the EU undertook the protocol modeled by the OIE155, the orga-
nization that is expressly mentioned by the SPS Agreement as 
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the relevant international standard setting body, to neutralize the 
four isolated cases of ASF.156 It is likely that this process can be 
deemed adequate to deal with the presence of disease.
Pursuant to the completion of the EU’s process to isolate 
these cases, it requested recognition of territories outside of the 
infected areas as disease-free.157 That request was rejected.158 
Lithuania, Poland, and the EU gave reasonable access to Russia 
to demonstrate the EU’s eradication of ASF and the likelihood 
that they would remain ASF-free. The EU argued that it kept 
Russia informed of all ASF-related action taken in both Poland 
and Lithuania.159 The EU additionally emphasized that it had 
undergone extensive negotiations to come to a regionalized solu-
tion, but that was to no avail.160 Russia unfoundedly rejected the 
EU’s requests for regional recognition and the two parties could 
not come to an agreed upon approach through negotiations.161
Russia failed to take into account the information available 
to it, and failed to adapt its measure within a reasonable period 
of time under Article 5.7. It failed to process the EU’s requests 
for recognition of disease-free areas without undue delay under 
Article 8, and continues to fail to recognize such areas. These 
failures establish Russia’s inability to adapt its measure to 
regional conditions in accordance with Article 6.
2. why the violationS in theSe caSe StuDieS anD 
their proGeny matter
The Indonesian ban on fruits from Chile and the Russian 
ban on pork and pork products from the EU are demonstrative of 
SPS measures that were implemented in a drastically over-broad 
manner and in violation of the SPS Agreement. These measures 
arguably may have been adopted in order to exploit economic 
opportunities and not for the protection of human, animal, and 
plant health. Regardless of the intent of the enacting party, these 
measures restricted, and continue to restrict trade in a serious 
manner. These cases elucidate the lack of understanding amongst 
the WTO Membership that the SPS Committee has been trying 
to resolve with respect to Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.162
Nevertheless, difficulty with implementation should not 
cause a failure to implement. In the Committee’s 2008 guidelines 
on the implementation of Article 6, it reiterated the importance 
of recognizing exporting Members’ disease and pest-free areas 
in an expeditious manner throughout the thirty-five paragraphs 
of the document.163 The Committee suggested that Members 
that have requested recognition multiple times, like Chile,164 
should be prioritized in the process, and that when the export-
ing Member quickly takes action in accordance with the relevant 
international standard and restores the area to a disease or pest-
free area, like Poland, Lithuania, and the EU,165 recognition 
should be granted quickly.166 Yet, Members still fail to properly 
adhere to Article 6 obligations, and continue to abuse SPS mea-
sures by using them for economically protective ends.
The requirement to tailor measures to regional conditions 
is a logical one and one that has significant implications for 
trade.167 Parts of a country with which safe trade can be con-
ducted should be able to trade freely notwithstanding infections 
or infestations that prevail elsewhere within that country.168 The 
free flow of trade is a cornerstone of the WTO, and to obstruct 
trade where there is no sound reason to do so not only flies in the 
face of that goal, but has important negative impacts on global 
trade. Further, those negative impacts are concentrated on the 
less developed Members, who are more vulnerable to pests and 
disease.169
Iv. recommendAtIons
The implementation of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement 
has plagued the WTO Membership since the SPS Agreement’s 
inception. By giving substantive effect to Article 6, the legal 
analysis set forth in United States–Animals addresses concerns 
that exporting Members have repeatedly expressed at SPS com-
mittee hearings.170 This approach which properly incorporates a 
“reasonable period of time” requirement for importing Members 
to review their measures, and a requirement for Members to 
undertake and complete reviews of exporting Members’ SPS 
conditions “without undue delay,” should be permanently and 
expressly adopted.
a. thiS reaDinG oF obliGationS unDer article 
6 FoSterS baSinG meaSureS on SounD, ScientiFic 
eviDence anD reDucinG barrierS to traDe
The time constraints under Articles 5.7 and 8 encourage 
Members to adapt their measures to the actually prevailing SPS 
conditions in a timely manner, which is directly in line with the 
WTO objective of reducing trade barriers. Imposing an obliga-
tion to minimize the effects of measures in areas that have not 
been affected by pests or disease, and an obligation to do so 
in a timely manner ensures a logical reduction of unnecessary 
restrictions on trade.171 Because of the “reasonable period of 
time” and “without undue delay” requirements, Members wish-
ing to impose barriers through SPS measures will be forced to 
actively assess whether their measures are based on scientific 
evidence172 of prevailing SPS conditions on a regional level. 
Under this approach, measures that are regionally adapted to 
actually prevailing SPS conditions will be the norm.
b. a reaDinG without time conStraintS woulD  
be GratuitouS
Article 6 does not merely require Members to recognize the 
concept of regionalization. In fact, to give Article 6 such little 
effect is indefensible because it erodes the separation between the 
obligations under paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. 
While 6.2 does facially only require Members to recognize the 
concept of regionalization, 6.1 requires that Members “ensure 
that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted” to 
regional conditions, which inherently requires a maintenance 
of measures that are appropriately adapted even as conditions 
change. Imposing the time constraints imposed by the United 
States – Animals panel provides frustrated exporting Members 
with a viable course of action, and provides permissibly protec-
tive importers a “reasonable” period of time during which they 
can adjust their measures when conditions do change.173
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c. StrikinG the balance between SovereiGn riGhtS 
anD Free traDe
Another important goal of the SPS Agreement is to main-
tain Members’ sovereign right to regulate imports to protect 
human, plant, and, animal health.174 To some degree, it is a 
hazardous proposition to oblige Members to recognize pest-free 
or disease-free areas quickly when pests or diseases are in the 
surrounding areas.175 Certainly a balance can be struck between 
the importing State’s interest in protecting its populations and 
the exporting State’s interest of being able to export goods from 
healthy areas without unwarranted restrictions on those goods.
A possible mechanism by which this balancing could be 
achieved would be to require the measure-imposing Member 
to reach out to the affected Member to attempt to better tailor 
the measure in accordance with the prevailing conditions within 
an established timeframe. 176 For example, a regime wherein 
the measure-imposing Members must work with the restricted 
Members to adapt the imposed measure within 90 days of its 
imposition would greatly increase the level of communication 
between these Members, and would significantly reduce the 
unnecessarily restrictive effects of these measures. This approach 
maintains the protective capacity of the restricting Member by 
enabling it to enact high barriers that it later tailors down as 
appropriate. Thus, the restricting Member can appropriately 
adapt its measure with adequate information thereby minimizing 
the restriction on trade caused by the measure while successfully 
protecting its plant, animal, and human populations.
As was demonstrated in the Indonesia and Russia case stud-
ies above,177 under the current regime the restricting Member can 
elude communication or draw out recognition processes, thereby 
continuing to impose its restriction. By forcing the restricting 
party to begin the process, that Member is automatically more 
involved than it is under the current system where that Member 
need only notify the WTO Members of new restrictions that it 
imposes.178 Placing an obligation to begin the regionalization of 
a measure on the restricting Member incentivizes the appropri-
ate party to take action because the restricted Member needs no 
further incentive to try to get the restriction reduced than the 
restriction itself, while the restricting Member may need the 
threat of WTO litigation to push it away from protectionism. 179
v. conclusIon
The legal framework from United States – Animals applied to 
current SPS measures confirms that violations of Article 6 of the 
SPS Agreement are present throughout the WTO Membership. 
That Panel’s analysis highlights Members’ obligations to expe-
dite the recognition of regional SPS conditions and to adapt 
measures appropriately, constituting an important advancement 
in the development of logical and equitable trade regulation. This 
progress may indeed be a new bastion particularly for devel-
oping nations that have been subject to overly restrictive SPS 
measures by ensuring that they have reasonable market access 
despite regional sanitary or phytosanitary concerns.
While the analysis is useful and edifies the appropriate way 
to read Article 6 of the SPS Agreement, the questions still remain 
as to how small a “region” can be, what constitutes an “undue 
delay,” and what constitutes a “reasonable period of time” for 
the purpose of this analysis. These questions represent the next 
phase of interpretation of this Article and likely the next phase 
of litigation at the Dispute Settlement Body. Further definition of 
these terms is required in order for the Membership to be able to 
properly implement this important Article and to further realize 
the WTO’s goal of trade liberalization. 
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